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In 1831, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that "the relation to the 
United States of the Indian tribes within its territorial limits resembles 
that of a ward to his guardian/' In explaining this observation, he went 
on to say of the Indians: "They look to our government for protection; 
rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their 
wants; and address the president as their great father. . . ."2 
Marshall's statement is still frequently quoted by the courts to de-
scribe a situation which to the present day has tied Indians to their 
Federal government in ways that are unique to this minority group. Out 
of this relationship has emerged a set of highly paternalistic interaction 
patterns based on the guardian-ward or father-child model. Observers of 
the contemporary Indian scene have recently attacked this relationship 
with considerable vehemence, maintaining that it has seriously damaged 
Indian personality development.3 
In a 1969 appearance before the Senate Subcommittee on Indian 
Education, psychiatrist Robert Leon remarked that: 
In the area of human development, the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs and the American Indians have been for 
years locked in a destructive interaction system. . . . This 
interaction pattern . . . stems from the inability of Indians 
to actively rebel against paternalistic attitudes of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. . . . We find Indians reacting in 
passive-aggressive and self-destructive ways to their anger 
over Bureau domination.4 
In a previous article on the same subject, Leon conjectured that the 
problems of passive-aggressive and self-destructive Indian behavior could 
be overcome by a deliberate and conscious effort on the part of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs to "reverse the authority patterns."5 
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The intent of the author in the present article is to examine some of 
the prevailing patterns of paternalism in U.S. Indian administration as 
practiced by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and to propose a series of 
actions which the Federal government and the Indians might take to 
move in the direction which Dr. Leon has advocated. 
paternalism and the individual indian 
The pinch of Federal paternalism is felt by Indians at two levels: 
that of the individual and that of the tribe. At both levels it relates most 
importantly to the management of land and income. At the individual 
level, it also relates to the provision of such community services as 
education, social welfare and law and order. 
On many reservations Indians enjoy the beneficial ownership of 
land allotments or interests in such allotments by virtue of what are 
known as "trust" or "restricted" titles. While assuring Indian holders 
the use of land and enjoyment of the fruits thereof, these titles do not 
permit them complete freedom with respect to property management. 
For example, the holder of a trust or restricted title may not sell, lease 
or mortgage his land without first securing the approval of the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs. Since the authority of the Commissioner is 
also limited in that he may not take actions concerning land allotments 
without the consent of the title holders, the relationship technically 
resembles partnership more than it does trusteeship, although the Indian 
Commissioner is generally referred to as the "trustee." To this partner-
ship the Indian contributes his land, the government contributes man-
agement skills and both may contribute capital and labor. From the 
Indian point of view, the positive elements of the relationship include 
entitlement to the profits and exemption from income and real property 
taxes. 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs provides a broad range of land man-
agement services to the holders of trust and restricted titles. Usually 
contributed without cost to the landholder, these include arranging for 
leases and sales, appraising land and resource values, husbanding renew-
able resources such as timber and collecting and distributing fees, 
rentals and royalties. 
Funds collected by the BIA from leases or sales of land and from 
sales of such resources as minerals and timber may be turned over 
directly to the owners, or retained in special accounts known as In-
dividual Indian Money Accounts and advanced in accordance with plans 
agreed upon by the Bureau and the Indian beneficiaries. 
Income from trust or restricted allotments is generally exempt from 
Federal and state taxes. This exemption extends to money derived from 
use of the land by the owners, as well as rental income from leasing. 
In addition to land and income management services, the Bureau of 
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Indian Affairs provided reservation communities with a number of social 
services—most notably education, social welfare (general assistance), 
adult vocational training, job placement and law enforcement. The 
more affluent tribes sometimes fund and operate programs of their own 
in these areas, especially scholarship assistance to college students,6 social 
welfare and law enforcement. They commonly pattern their programs 
after those of the Bureau, although decision making rests in tribal hands. 
In the case of programs funded by the Federal government, decision 
making has traditionally been entirely in the hands of Indian Bureau 
officials. 
The Federal trusteeship over Indian lands was established originally 
to protect Indians from exploitation and alienation of their property. 
The tax exemption stems from the trusteeship, since courts have held 
that Indian trust property enjoys the same tax immunity as would prop-
erty wholly owned or controlled by the Federal government. 
If he chooses to do so, the holder of a trust or restricted title may 
petition to have all restrictions removed. In deciding whether to grant 
such petitions, the Indian Bureau must be satisfied that the petitioner is 
competent to manage the property prudently. However, there are at 
present no formal guidelines for making such a determination and as a 
result, some Indians with relatively little ability at land management 
have received full fee titles—often leading to the sale of land out of 
Indian ownership—whereas others with obviously greater ability con-
tinue to hold trust titles and enjoy tax immunity. This latter fact is a 
source of great annoyance to state and local officials, managers of heavily 
taxed industries in reservation states, Congressmen and some Federal 
administrators. When major reform of the system is discussed, such per-
sons point to the tax exemption as the area in which reform should 
begin.7 
Indians, on the other hand, resist change most strongly in this area, 
not only because of their desire to maintain the tax exemption and 
continue to be eligible for land management services, but because many 
—especially those in positions of tribal leadership—also recognize that 
trusteeship with all its paternalism has been an effective instrument for 
keeping land in Indian ownership. This is important because owning 
land is a means of maintaining a link with tribal history, it provides a 
measure of security and it is an important symbol of tribal identity.8 
Many Indians apparently do favor a relaxation of Federal controls 
with respect to income.9 Unlike land, money is not related to the main-
tenance of tribal identity, and the tax exemption which stems from the 
trust status of the land applies to the income it produces without regard 
to whether the income itself is held in trust. The present Indian Bureau 
guidelines with respect to the administration of income from trust land 
are vague, and local Bureau officials have latitude in deciding which 
Indians shall receive trust funds without strings and which shall not. 
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Inspired perhaps in part by the Indian Community Action Programs 
which have developed on many reservations since passage of the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act in 1964, some tribal leaders have in recent years 
appealed to the Bureau of Indian Affairs to restructure the system of 
providing community services on the reservations so as to permit them 
to administer such services themselves. A continuing Federal subsidy 
would, of course, be required since most Indian tribes lack the revenue 
to meet the costs of these services. Unlike the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity, the Indian Bureau has no authority to make direct grants to 
tribes for such purposes, but the Solicitor for the Department of the 
Interior has held that the Bureau may enter into contracts with tribes 
providing for them to administer services to their members. 
Responding to requests from particular tribes, the Indian Bureau 
had, by mid-1969, concluded contracts with some thirty groups by the 
terms of which the Indians were providing various kinds of law and 
order services for their own communities. At the Salt River Reservation 
in Arizona, the tribe had taken over complete responsibility for police 
protection and the maintenance of detention facilities and all BIA law 
enforcement personnel had been withdrawn. 
In the field of social services (welfare) the Bureau had contracted 
with fourteen different Indian tribes for the administration of work 
assistance programs. Two Indian communities—Blackwater on the Gila 
River Reservation and Rough Rock on the Navajo Reservation—had 
contracted for the operation of local elementary schools.10 At the Chero-
kee Reservation in North Carolina, BIA administrators continued to 
operate the elementary school, but maintenance and bus service were 
provided through contract. 
In justifying appropriations requests before examiners of the Bureau 
of the Budget and members of the appropriations committees of Congress 
during the 1960's, the author encountered resistance to tribal service 
contracts from individuals who expressed concern that the Indians might 
not administer contract funds wisely and efficiently. Such persons main-
tained that so long as the Federal government was paying the bills, it 
should also run the programs. In the late winter of 1968, when the 
author was working with White House aides in preparing a major 
message on Indians for President Johnson to deliver to Congress, he 
found Bureau of the Budget personnel reluctant to approve a statement 
encouraging the formation of local Indian community school boards to 
administer education programs. At least twice while the document was 
in the drafting stage, Budget Bureau officials edited the message to read 
"Indian advisory school boards." Although the word advisory was de-
leted before the message was delivered, BIA officials later in the year 
found the examiners of the Bureau of the Budget unchanged in their 
opposition to tribal service contracts for education.11 
Opposition has also emerged from professionals within the Indian 
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Bureau. Educators, social welfare workers and law enforcement person-
nel, for example, have in the author's presence expressed concern that a 
transfer of administrative responsibility might result in a lowering of 
service standards. Among other objections, they have pointed out that 
few Indians have been professionally trained for these responsibilities 
and, in the absence of assurances of tenure and adequate salary, few out-
side professionals could be attracted to work on the reservations. 
Another potential barrier to tribal service contracts is the legal one. 
At present, the Indian Bureau relies upon an antiquated statute known 
as the "Buy Indian" Act for its authority to enter into such agreements. 
Passed into law more than half a century ago, this Act was intended to 
stimulate the purchase by the BIA of certain goods produced by Indians. 
The Solicitor of the Interior Department has construed the Act broadly 
enough to permit the purchase of services as well as goods. However, 
that opinion is open to challenge by Congress, the Bureau of the Budget 
or the courts, and should problems arise involving the misuse of funds 
under a service contract, a challenge could well be forthcoming. 
A final barrier to the more rapid conversion from Federal to local 
administration is the attitude of the Indians themselves. In a personal 
communication to the author, the Superintendent of the Pima Agency in 
Arizona reported in 1969 that he had been trying without success for 
nearly a year to interest the Indians under his jurisdiction in assuming 
full responsibility for administering the law and order program on the 
reservation. Tribal leaders thus far have indicated they do not consider 
themselves ready to take on this additional burden. 
Some Indians apparently fear that once the administrative change 
has been made, the Federal government may withdraw its financial 
support. Wendell Chino, Chairman of the Mescalero (New Mexico) 
Apaches and formerly President of the National Congress of American 
Indians, presented a statement of these views to President Nixon in 
December of 1968. According to him: 
If Indian tribes with very little capital contract with the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, this contracting could bankrupt 
them unless payment procedures by the Bureau are im-
proved. Further, the failure of Congress to give continuity 
of appropriations for Indian contract programs and de-
velopments could leave Indian contractors with costly, but 
unusable equipment. Excessive contract supervision and 
red tape requirements should also be kept in check if 
Indian tribes are to be expected to contract successfully.12 
paternalism and the tribe 
From the standpoint of an Indian tribe, Federal paternalism also has 
an impact upon the management of land and income. In addition, it 
intrudes into the area of tribal self-government. 
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With respect to land, tribal holdings are usually of the same character 
as individual allotments—that is, they are held in trust by the Federal 
government. Usually, title to the land is actually in the Federal govern-
ment, rather than the tribe, although legislation or executive order re-
quires that the land be administered for the benefit of the Indians. (The 
legal status of Indian tribal lands is exceedingly complicated and one 
would have to go well beyond the scope of this article to describe it 
thoroughly.) 
Transactions involving tribal land, except for those relating to its 
use by the Indian owners, require the approval of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs. Such transactions do not include sales, since tribal trust 
land cannot be sold without the consent of Congress. The same range 
of land services provided the owners of individual lands is also available 
to tribes with group holdings. 
In most instances tribal trust funds are required by law to be credited 
to the Indians and placed in special accounts of the U.S. Treasury where 
they earn simple interest at the rate of four per cent per year. In the 
past, this has been a favorable rate, but under present conditions it is 
not so regarded and, as a result, many tribes have asked to have their 
funds transferred from the Treasury into private investments producing 
a higher yield. When the Bureau of Indian Affairs arranges such in-
vestments, the funds retain their trust status and may not be withdrawn 
by the Indians without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior. 
Tribal funds in Treasury deposits are subject to appropriation by Con-
gress—in spite of the fact that they belong to the Indians. Money de-
rived from the successful presentation of lawsuits against the Federal 
government is also subject to appropriation, and cannot be advanced 
after its appropriation until a plan for its use has been adopted by the 
tribe and approved by both the Congress and the Interior Secretary. 
When planning for the use of tribal funds in the custody of the 
U.S. Treasury, tribal officials prepare annual budgets which are subject 
to approval by the regional directors of the Indian Bureau. Guidelines 
for budget approval—like those for the administration of individual 
Indian money—are vague and, therefore, may be interpreted flexibly or 
rigidly, depending upon the persuasions' of individual administrators. 
In general, the money which tribes earn from their own use of reser-
vation lands and resources—as, for example, in the case of the operation 
of tribal enterprises—is deposited in bank accounts controlled by the 
tribes themselves. Insofar as the annual budget of a tribe consists of 
those "local" funds, it does not require BIA approval. 
Tribal earnings from trust resources, like those of individual Indian 
landowners, are exempt from taxation. This exemption extends both 
to funds earned by tribal enterprises and those derived from leases, 
royalties, mineral exploration permits, rights-of-way and so on. 
One common source of conflict between tribal leaders and Federal 
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administrators is the requirement that certain actions of tribal governing 
bodies or tribal members acting together must be approved by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs.13 These actions include the adoption of con-
stitutions under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the amend-
ment of such constitutions, certain kinds of tribal council resolutions, 
and tribal ordinances. 
The Indian Reorganization Act specifies that the Secretary must call 
constitutional elections, as well as approve constitutions and constitu-
tional amendments before they become effective. This sometimes poses 
a dilemma for him, in that he may be asked to call an election to vote 
on an amendment or constitution which he knows beforehand he cannot 
approve. In most instances petitioners or tribal leaders withdraw elec-
tion requests when advised that approval will not be forthcoming, but 
there have been instances where this was not so. For example, in 1966, 
the Walker River Paiute Tribe of Nevada requested an election to 
amend its constitution so as to redefine membership requirements. The 
effect of the amendment would have been to disenfranchise many persons 
who had previously enjoyed the full benefits of tribal citizenship. Al-
though Secretary Udall did not indicate how he would react to such an 
amendment, other officials of the Department of the Interior communi-
cated their opposition to members of the Tribal Council who still in-
sisted that an election be called. In the letter complying with their 
request, the Secretary pointed out that his decision to hold the election 
should not be regarded as an endorsement of the amendment. 
The supporters of the amendment were successful in securing a favor-
able vote, but the Secretary disapproved the action. 
Tribal council resolutions calling for the advancement of trust funds 
for any purpose are subject to Indian Bureau approval, but in the case 
of funds destined to pay outside tribal advisers, there is a double dose of 
paternalism. Present Federal law requires that contracts with such per-
sons be approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Today, most of the 
larger and wealthier tribes engage attorneys on a retainer basis, paying 
out about a million dollars annually in fees and expenses.14 
Other consultants are sometimes employed for such purposes as 
appraising land and resources, although these services are available 
through the Bureau of Indian Affairs. When tribes invest their own 
funds in the employment of such persons, they usually do so because of 
dissatisfaction with the quality of BIA services. Paradoxically, decisions 
made on the basis of advice from these consultants—even though their 
contracts have been approved by the Department of the Interior—may 
still be subject to review and approval by the Indian Bureau, since the 
existence of a contract does not absolve the Federal government from 
the responsibility for actions taken in accordance with a private con-
sultant's advice. Nevertheless, armed with an opinion from its own 
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expert, a tribe is in a stronger position than otherwise to challenge a 
course of action proposed by the Bureau with which it does not agree. 
There are other kinds of tribal resolutions which also require Federal 
approval. The authority calling for such approval is the governing 
document of the particular tribe. During the 1930's, when BIA person-
nel were assisting tribes with drafting their constitutions, they frequently 
insisted upon the insertion of clauses requiring Secretarial approval for 
specified actions as a check against improper actions by the tribal gov-
erning bodies. 
The law and order ordinances of tribes are subject to review or ap-
proval also when organizational documents so prescribe. Furthermore, 
in the case of the few remaining tribes which have never promulgated 
law and order codes of their own and which are subject to regulations 
developed by the Department of the Interior, all ordinances recom-
mended by the tribes require Secretarial approval.15 
In spite of the fact that not all actions of tribal councils require 
Federal approval, and others require approval only because the constitu-
tions of particular tribes so prescribe, the Secretary of the Interior does 
exercise authority over many of the most important actions taken by the 
governing bodies of a majority of the tribes. 
Administrators of the Indian Bureau, in explaining why they have 
taken few steps to seek changes in the present system of Federal super-
vision over tribal councils and their actions, have in the past cited the 
fact that these governing bodies were often abusive of the civil rights 
of their members, who did not enjoy the legal remedies for such abuse 
afforded other American citizens by the Bill of Rights of the United 
States Constitution.16 Subjecting certain of the actions of tribal councils 
to approval by the Secretary of the Interior has been looked upon as one 
means of controlling this situation. Now however, with the passage in 
1968 of an Indian Civil Rights Act—which was in part drafted to over-
come the above deficiency—the argument of BIA officials may no longer 
apply.17 
While the formal pattern of Federal intervention in tribal affairs has 
changed little since the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 
1934, the amount of paternalism has lessened somewhat in the past 
thirty-five years. Informed and aggressive tribal leaders have insisted 
upon emphasizing the partnership features of their relationship with 
the Federal government, rather than the guardianship features, and have 
demanded a greater share of decision-making authority within the exist-
ing framework. Basehart and Sasaki discuss this situation at some length 
in their study of the Jicarilla Apaches of New Mexico.18 The fact re-
mains, however, that the potential for paternalism remains high, and 
many BIA administrators continue to behave paternalistically toward 
the Indians with whom they are associated. 
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programming a retreat from paternalism 
Underlying the proposals which follow is the conviction that efforts 
to change present paternalistic patterns require Indian support if they 
are to succeed. During the period between 1961 and 1968, when the 
author was serving as Associate Commissioner of Indian Affairs, not one 
piece of major Indian legislation was enacted over the general objections 
of the Indian tribes. Among those bills which were defeated were various 
measures relating to a solution of the so-called "heirship problem"19 and 
the Indian Resources Development Act of 1967 (popularly named "the 
Omnibus Bill"). Many members of Congress supported the former, and 
the latter had the support of the Johnson Administration. Indians 
opposed both and lobbied extensively and successfully against them. 
Mindful of the need for Indian support to overcome paternalism and 
taking into account recent developments in Indian affairs and among 
other minority groups in our society, the author has formulated a set of 
propositions which have guided him in the development of specific 
proposals. These propositions are the following: 
(1) Indians will resist changes in the present system which 
threaten their personal and tribal identities as Indians. 
In such statements as that made at the 1961 American 
Indian Chicago Conference and in the annual resolu-
tions of the National Congress of American Indians, 
leaders of the Indian tribes have stressed their desire to 
continue to be Indians in both the personal and the 
tribal sense. 
(2) Land is viewed as vital to retention of Indian identity, 
and Indians will resist any changes in the present 
system which pose threats to their ownership of land.20 
(3) The benefits of tax exemptions on trust land and in-
come outweigh in the eyes of many Indians the pater-
nalistic disadvantages of the present system. This is 
true not only because of the financial advantages in-
volved, but because Indians view tax foreclosure as a 
threat to their ownership of land. 
(4) Income is not associated with Indian identity in the 
same way that land is, and Indians will more likely 
support a relaxation of present restrictions on income 
expenditure than on land use. 
(5) With the advantage of nearly thirty-five years of experi-
ence behind them, Indian groups generally are compe-
tent to assume more responsibility for administering 
their own lands and money than they presently have; 
however, they will resist efforts to thrust more respon-
sibility upon them without their prior agreement. 
Frequently cited by Indian leaders as a reason for 
opposing the Indian Resources Development Act of 
1967 was their belief that they had not been properly 
consulted with respect to developing this legislative 
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proposal. Passage of the Act would have given tribes, 
at their own option, much greater control of their 
resources, both land and money. 
(6) Most Indians are capable of managing their juersonal 
incomes, although some—such as minors and those who 
are legally incompetent—will require continuing as-
sistance in this regard, either through Federal super-
vision or through court appointed guardians.21 
(7) With the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968, the likelihood of oppressive action by tribal gov-
erning bodies against individual members has lessened, 
and can no longer serve as a valid excuse for continu-
ing Federal supervision over such matters as tribal 
resolutions, ordinances and constitutional amendments. 
(8) With private attorneys available, review of tribal 
actions by Federal administrators to determine their 
legality and constitutionality should no longer be neces-
sary. 
(9) Indians may be expected to increase their demands for 
more control over Federal programs for the provision 
of local community services in line with the national 
trend in this regard. 
(10) In connection with transferring greater authority to 
individual Indians and tribes, action must also be 
taken to relieve Federal officials of responsibility for 
the outcome of decisions taken pursuant thereto. 
Basehart and Sasaki have pointed out that as tribal 
leaders become more aggressive in their demands to 
share authority with the Federal government and to 
have complete authority over certain matters, the ef-
fective authority of an Indian Bureau Superintendent 
is apt to decrease, whereas at the same time, his respon-
sibility does not diminish. He remains legally respon-
sible for the performance of his trust obligations and 
is subject to legal suit as the accountable agent. They 
note that "if these two trends were to continue over 
time, a Superintendent would find himself in the wholly 
untenable position of lacking any effective authority or 
power while continuing to have responsibility."22 
The first barrier to overcome in reversing authority patterns is that 
of non-Indian attitudes with respect to land management and taxation. 
So long as many Congressmen, along with Federal budget specialists 
and administrators, insist upon commencing their attack on paternalism 
in these areas, rather than elsewhere, the prospect of Indian support is 
virtually nil. Conceding the importance of eventually coming to grips 
with these topics, the author suggests they be shelved temporarily in 
favor of other changes which will be viewed positively by the Indians 
and permit them management and decision-making experiences which 
can contribute to greater self-confidence in facing the day when the 
most basic paternalistic features of the reservation system can be altered. 
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Contracting for community services provides one of the most im-
portant areas in which to begin. Not only will it be possible to take 
advantage of a national trend toward greater local control of Federally 
funded services, but Indians themselves are now expressing increased 
interest in such programs. The question of whether to seek immediate 
strengthening of the Indian Bureau's authority for contracting (and 
risk losing even the authority it now has) is a tactical one, but the 
Bureau, if it is willing to view the opinion of the Department Solicitor 
in its most favorable light, can move immediately toward much more 
contracting than is presently underway. At the outset, standards may 
suffer since there are many obvious problems connected with the employ-
ment by tribes of competent administrators, but risk taking and transfer 
of responsibility are much more plausible in this area than, for example, 
with respect to land management. 
A second major area in which the Indian Bureau can transfer both 
authority and responsibility is with respect to income management, 
individual as well as tribal. Those tribes which prefer to withdraw their 
income from the U.S. Treasury and place it in private bank accounts 
should be encouraged to do so and the law changed to permit such 
action and relieve the Secretary of the Interior of further responsibility. 
On the other hand, the author believes that until all tribes have agreed 
to make this change, the option to deposit tribal funds in the U.S. 
Treasury should remain open. 
Often overlooked by those who insist upon Federal supervision of 
tribal funds are two facts: first, many tribes now have more than thirty 
years of experience in managing large sums of money; and second, 
income from tribal enterprises, some of which are of considerable size, 
goes into local bank accounts and is managed by the tribes without Fed-
eral supervision. It is inconsistent to regard tribes as capable of manag-
ing money derived from some sources, but not others. 
Present procedures for supervising the expenditure of awards made 
to tribes by the Indian Claims Commission and the Court of Claims are 
among the most paternalistic in the whole realm of Indian administra-
tion. After a tribe has been granted such an award, the money is 
automatically placed in a Treasury account; but the Indians see little of 
it23 until they have presented a plan for the use of the award, the plan 
has been approved by the Department of the Interior and Congress has 
enacted a special bill appropriating the money subject to the provisions 
of the plan. Several years may thus go by before a tribe is able to gain 
access to its own funds. 
In 1968, while addressing the annual meeting of the National Con-
gress of American Indians, the author was vigorously applauded for 
suggesting that claims awards be paid directly to tribes wherever pos-
sible. There is little reason to doubt that the Indians would lend their 
support to such a proposal. 
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For the most part, individual Indians today receive income from 
leases, rights-of-way and other uses of their land without any restrictions, 
although such income is frequently collected and disbursed by the Indian 
Bureau. Some Indians seem to prefer receiving their money from the 
BIA disbursing office, rather than directly from lessees. The author 
would not consider it wise to establish an "either-or" policy in this 
regard, but wherever leasing is not complicated by fractionated owner-
ship of allotments,24 the Bureau should as a matter of policy, offer the 
Indian owners the option of receiving payment directly. Some super-
intendents already do this routinely; others do not. 
A third area in which the Bureau might move to change its paternal-
istic image is with respect to the approval of constitutions, constitutional 
amendments, tribal ordinances and tribal resolutions. In many cases, 
this would involve encouraging the tribes to eliminate from their con-
stitutions those provisions which call for Bureau approval of tribal 
actions. It would also call for amendments to the Indian Reorganization 
Act. The likelihood of Indian support for such changes will be much 
greater if they are permitted some options in the matter. 
Dobyns25 has observed that Indian tribes, especially since the passage 
of the Indians Claims Commission Act of 1946, have acquired consider-
able sophistication in dealing with such outside consultants as attorneys. 
Those tribes which prefer to select their own advisors and determine 
the amount of their salaries or fees should be permitted to do so. How-
ever, amendments to present law which would make this possible should 
also provide for a plebiscite of the full membership before independent 
contracting authority is passed to tribal councils. The latter provision 
is desirable because at the present time many Indians view the involve-
ment of the BIA as helpful in preventing domination by particular 
political factions and the consultants identified with them. 
In addition to seeking legislation to permit tribes the option of con-
tracting without Bureau supervision, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
should take the legal steps necessary to free himself from responsibility 
for decisions which tribes make upon the advice of these consultants. 
Otherwise, he will continue to feel the need for intervention in tribal 
decision making. 
Relaxing paternalism in the area of land management is the knottiest 
problem of all, since this issue is mixed up with the emotionalism sur-
rounding such questions as land ownership, Indian identity, tribal sov-
ereignty and taxation. Nevertheless, without posing threats in these 
areas, greater decision making options can be provided both tribes and 
individual Indians. 
In the case of the latter, the Bureau of Indian Affairs should en-
courage the development of opportunities for individual Indians, with 
the aid of outside advisors—whether BIA employees or private con-
sultants—to negotiate and conclude leases and sales free of BIA super-
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vision. Here, too, the Commissioner would need to seek legislation to 
absolve himself from the responsibility for decisions flowing from this 
exercise of Indian initiative. 
The long and often heated debate over the Indian Resources De-
velopment Act of 1967 revealed that there are some tribes which do 
want more control of their land resources and which are willing to 
assume the full responsibility for their decisions, provided they are not 
forced to give up present tax exemptions. Rather than seeking general 
legislation defining procedures under which such transfer of authority 
and responsibility may take place, the Indian Bureau should encourage 
tribes to come forth with their own plans and seek individual legislation 
in this regard. A few have already done so, and others are contemplating 
such action. 
In all instances where regulations and statutes are changed to permit 
greater authority and responsibility for Indians, the option of con-
tinuing under present arrangements should be provided. Furthermore, 
Indians should not be forced to make decisions about these matters 
within some arbitrary time frame such as that imposed by the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934. Not all are equally ready, or equally 
willing, to go it on their own. 
The question of Indian tax immunity is admittedly a vital one which 
has received little attention in this article. However, Indians will resist 
the assumption of this responsibility more strongly than any other, and 
proposals for reversing authority patterns which are tied to this issue, 
or pointed toward it, will be rejected by them. Therefore, looking at 
the matter primarily from the standpoint of paternalism and its de-
bilitating effects, we must begin where a start can be made with the 
expectation of Indian support, and leave the tax question for future 
consideration. 
Most of the recent discussions concerning changes in Federal-Indian 
relationships have centered more on the issue of whether to transfer the 
Indian Bureau out of the Department of the Interior or shift some of 
its functions elsewhere, than on the much more basic question of revers-
ing the paternalistic patterns of the reservation system. Underlying most 
of the proposals emerging from these discussions has been the feeling 
that the Bureau has failed to carry out its "service" mission in an efficient 
and effective manner. Without attempting to argue the question of 
efficiency, I find all such proposals deficient in that they place so little 
emphasis on real change in the critical area of Federal paternalism. 
Indians also sense this deficiency, as is evidenced by the following quota-
tion which Stan Steiner attributes to a tribal leader in New Mexico: 
"It's good to know your enemy. We know the Bureau. 
Anway, it's weak now. On its last legs. If the tribes keep 
up the pressure to run things themselves, soon we would be 
able to take over the Bureau's services. But if they give it 
17 
over to one of those aggressive agencies we'll never be able 
to win self-determination from them. We will have to 
begin again. At the beginning. To try to convince a whole 
new carload of bureaucrats that what we want is to do 
these things ourselves."2C 
University of Arizona 
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